Regulating the internet in the interests of children: emerging European and international approaches by Livingstone, Sonia
  
Sonia Livingstone 
Regulating the internet in the interests of 
children: emerging European and 
international approaches 
 
Book section 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Originally published in Livingstone, Sonia (2011) Regulating the internet in the interests of 
children: emerging European and international approaches. In: Mansell, Robin and Raboy, Marc, 
(eds.) The Handbook of Global Media and Communication Policy. Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, UK, 
pp. 505-524. ISBN 9781405198714  
 
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/44962/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: October 2014 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s submitted version of the book section. There may be differences 
between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s 
version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 1 
Original citation: 
Livingstone, S. (2011) Regulating the internet in the interests of children: Emerging 
European and international approaches. In Mansell, R., and Raboy, M. (Eds.) The 
Handbook on Global Media and Communication Policy (505-524). Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
 
 
 
Regulating the internet in the interests of children: 
Emerging European and international approaches 
 
Sonia Livingstone
1
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
s.livingstone@lse.ac.uk 
 
 
Introduction 
 
‘Online privacy, child safety, free speech and anonymity are on a collision 
course’ (Szoka and Thierer 2009: 1). 
 
Governments around the world are actively promoting internet infrastructure, 
diffusion and use in the workplace, schools, communities and households. There is 
growing consensus that if this is to serve the interests of the public, including – my 
concern here - children and young people, policy-makers must determine how best to 
facilitate online opportunities while also reducing or managing the associated risks. 
Although there remain difficulties in identifying just what opportunities and risks the 
internet might afford, many initiatives are underway nationally and internationally to 
establish a regulatory regime for the online environment, partially though not wholly 
paralleling the regulation of the offline environment. Drawing mainly on an account 
of emerging governance practices in the United Kingdom (UK) and Europe, though 
noting the strong influence on these of United States (US) industry, regulator and 
child welfare advocacy, I ask how competing interests can be, and are being managed 
in practice. My aim is to capture recent debates and practice regarding the protection 
and empowerment of children online, although my broader rationale in favor of 
(careful and proportionate) regulation may apply to other ‘vulnerable’ or minority 
groups or even to the protection and empowerment of the public at large. 
 
I begin, not with matters of regulation but with children’s experiences of the internet. 
There is increasing evidence that the internet amplifies and intensifies the nature of 
childhood (and adult) experiences. On the one hand, children’s avenues for 
participation, their resources for education and their circles of connection for 
friendship and intimacy are all expanded and more accessible (boyd 2008; Dahlgren 
and Olsson 2008; Ito et al. 2008; Willett 2008). It is evident that, given minimal 
conditions of access and literacy, children relish the opportunities afforded by the 
internet, often responding to these in creative, diverse and highly literate ways. 
However, empirical analysis of children’s online experiences qualifies the popular 
rhetoric regarding ‘digital natives’ (Bennett, Maton and Kervin 2008), suggesting that 
society must be realistic about their skills and look beyond children’s enthusiasm 
when formulating policies to ensure fairness of opportunity, ambitious expectations 
 2 
for participation and digital literacies and, not least, reasonable expectations of safety 
for all (Livingstone 2009).  
 
At the same time, evidence is also growing that the internet amplifies and intensifies 
the risk of harm to children (Muir 2005). For a child victim, an image of abuse may 
now be distributed anywhere worldwide in a matter of seconds and never eradicated 
(Internet Watch Foundation, IWF 2008). For the bullied child, a hostile site morphing 
their image or inviting ridicule may harm them anywhere, anytime, hostility even 
reaching into their bedroom (Nightingale, Dickenson and Griff 2000). For a teenager 
in despair, a community of suicidal others advocating the means of self-harm may be 
reached at the click of a mouse with a convenience that is historically unprecedented 
(Alao, Soderberg, Pohl and Alao 2006). And for the young bully or racist, the internet 
affords new and convenient means of harming others that are not easily detectable 
(Barak 2005; Shariff and Churchill 2010). It is not that online risks are necessarily 
unfamiliar in and of themselves. Rather, the ways and possibly the extent to which 
children now encounter these familiar risks is distinctively new – faster, more 
privatized and more permanent, with the most inclusive access to tools for image 
production and distribution ever known, thereby enabling both extensive circles of 
influence and many unanticipated consequences. 
 
Children’s everyday contexts of internet use combine experiences of both 
opportunities and risks, forcing the belated recognition that these often go hand in 
hand, the former tending to increase rather than decrease the chances of encountering 
the latter. This poses difficult questions of balance in managing children’s online 
experiences, for policy relating to opportunities must be integrated with, rather than 
remain entirely separate from that relating to risk and safety (Livingstone 2009). 
Celebrating young people’s enterprise and enthusiasm while failing to engage with or 
support their online activities or their experience of online harms will surely fail to 
bring to fruition the great expectations society holds not only for the internet but also 
for children. How far, then, should policy-makers facilitate the provision of resources 
– to promote such positive goals as online education, participation, creativity and so 
forth?
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 How far can the (young) people’s digital literacy be relied upon for judicious 
navigation of the internet or is regulation required to ensure sufficient protection 
(Livingstone 2008)? Are online risks best addressed by particular agencies, and at 
international, national or community levels? 
 
Although we still lack robust answers to these questions, the emerging consensus is 
that maximizing opportunities while minimizing risks is a task for multiple 
stakeholders, requiring not only financial investment but also adaptation to rapid 
change, apportioning responsibility flexibly among relevant parties, applying local or 
national experience to confront a global phenomenon and learning new forms of 
expertise. But is this the optimal approach, and how is it working in practice? 
 
Positive and Negative Internet Regulation in the Interests of Children 
 
Early in the internet’s history, two problematic claims were much reiterated: first, that 
the internet should not be regulated at all and second, that even arguments that 
regulation would protect children must be rejected since these may have the 
consequence, deliberate or otherwise, of restricting (adult) freedom of expression 
online. Echoes of both claims persist in current multi-stakeholder dialogues, 
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especially when matters become fraught. Although few would make such bald 
assertions today, their legacy is discernable in the tendency of policy discourses to pit 
child protection against adult freedom of expression. Most simply, this results in a 
rhetoric which puts children’s needs in conflict with those of adults; and in such a 
balancing act of the weak versus the powerful, children will surely lose out. Even in 
more complex debates, there is frustration when protectionist voices from child and 
family welfare constituencies seem to legitimize a brake on either personal or 
commercial freedoms. Consider Castells’ (2002: 169-70) comment on the overturning 
of the 1996 Communications Decency Act: 
 
‘Control of information has been the essence of state power throughout 
history… This is why one of the exemplary values of the American 
Constitution is precisely to place the right to free speech as the First 
Amendment of the Constitution. In their attempt to exercise control over the 
Internet, the US Congress and the US Justice Department used the argument 
that strikes a chord in every one of us: the protection of children from the 
sexual evils roaming the Internet’. 
 
Or, as Raboy and Shtern (2010: 219) observe more recently, ‘[a]t the 2008 IGF 
[Internet Governance Forum] for example, the push for online child protection was 
perceived to be a threat to privacy and freedom of expression rights’.3 Policy efforts 
may even seem to minimize attention to children’s interests in order to promote adult 
freedoms. However, as I note below, the early arguments against internet regulation 
have been strongly rebutted first by legal theory regarding cyberspace and second, by 
advocates of children’s rights online as well as offline. As Lessig (1999) observes, 
since the internet is and must be regulated, the key questions focus on regulatory 
choices – what, how, why and with what benefits and costs? Attempts over the past 
decade or so to answer these questions have generated an array of regulatory 
experiments nationally and internationally.  
 
There is a further reason why any simple opposition of adult freedom and child 
protection must be transcended, and that is that it undermines recognition of both 
children’s positive rights (including freedom of expression) and adults’ rights to 
privacy and protection of harm. Indeed, one may identify four distinct regulatory 
goals at issue here – support for children’s rights to freedom and to protection, and 
support for adult’s rights to freedom and to protection. In calling for a balanced 
approach to regulating the internet in the interests of children, therefore, I hope to 
avoid pitting a weaker constituency against a stronger by reframing the regulatory 
challenge for each constituency separately. Thus, I focus primarily on the task of 
maximizing children’s online freedoms while minimizing their exposure to online 
risks (a balance required also by the 1989 United Nations (UN) Convention on the 
Rights of the Child; Hamelink 2008). Some of the arguments that follow have wider 
implications for the parallel balance to be achieved between adult freedoms and adult 
protection (witness recent concerns about privacy, data protection, copyright 
infringement, bullying, spam, phishing and other scams, etc.).  
 
It should be noted that I use the term ‘regulation’ in the broadest sense, referring to 
the relation between power and the ordering of social behavior, at any and all levels of 
society from the transnational organization, the nation-state, the subnational 
organization or community and/or the individual. I then follow the contemporary 
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theorists of the state (see Jessop 2002) who argue that Western advanced industrial 
democracies are undergoing a profound shift in regulatory regimes from a 
government-led ‘command-and control’ model to a mixed model of governance 
encompassing state, co- and self-regulation, thereby dispersing power away from the 
state, often to newly powerful transnational bodies. For academic and policy 
observers, this shift raises significant questions about the legitimacy, authority, 
accountability and effectiveness of different forms of regulation, as well as about the 
increasing complexity of their interrelations. But before addressing today’s complex 
situation, let us consider a simple and, at the time, popularly endorsed claim, below. 
 
‘We do not intend to regulate the internet’ 
 
In 2002, the UK’s then Secretary for State, Media, Culture and Sport, Tessa Jowell, 
announced, ‘we do not intend to regulate the internet’ (Commons Hansard 2002: np). 
Accordingly, the 2003 Communications Act established Ofcom, the UK’s new, 
converged regulator for a newly convergent media environment, with no requirements 
regarding the internet in its remit. Nonetheless, spurred on by rapid advances in 
technological innovation combined with an unstable economy, the possible rationale 
for internet regulation has been much debated during the last decade, in the UK and 
elsewhere (Tambini et al. 2008). Particularly, multiple justifications for internet 
regulation have, increasingly if sometimes reluctantly, become widely accepted 
following the publication (notably pre-dating Jowell’s speech) of Lessig’s (1999) 
Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace. Some reflect a concern for the interests of 
children or other vulnerable or minority groups, though they also reflect the concerns 
of the private sector (especially in relation to market freedoms, intellectual property 
and copyright) and the state (especially in relation to privacy, data protection and 
threats to national security). Undoubtedly, internet regulation is fast rising up the 
policy agenda. For example, the UK’s All Party Parliamentary Communications 
Group released a report in October 2009 entitled ‘Can we keep our hands off the 
Net?’4 which gathered together many and diverse calls for regulation, echoing those 
on the agenda of the fourth annual meeting of the UN Internet Governance Forum 
held in Egypt in November 2009. 
 
So, what did the Secretary of State mean when she declared that ‘we do not intend to 
regulate the internet’? Many libertarians hoped this meant we should not regulate the 
internet for reasons of freedom of speech and against any policies of censorship. 
Concern over the slippery slope argument – that advocacy for the protection of 
children opens the door to censorship of content for adults and even the state 
surveillance of citizens – has been expressed by many critics (Brown 2008; Petley 
2009), especially those concerned with the US’s First Amendment and the legitimacy 
of any qualifications to this (for example, the ‘right’ to hostile or hate speech in the 
US in schools is not protected, raising interesting questions regarding the regulation of 
cyberbullying).
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 A well known illustration of this clash of interests was the successful 
attack (in defence of civil liberties) by the Electronic Frontier Foundation on the US’s 
Communications Decency Act, 1996 (designed, among other things, to prevent online 
pornography reaching children; Murray 2007). 
 
A second reading of Jowell’s claim is that we can’t regulate the internet – because it 
is a vast and global technology, horizontal more than vertical in its management 
structures, and as impractical to monitor (as for postal and telecommunications 
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services) – hence the early provision of mere conduit6 restrictions on internet service 
provider liability (Brown in press). As Negroponte famously stated in 1996, ‘[t]he 
Internet cannot be regulated. It’s not that laws aren’t relevant, it’s that the nation-state 
is not relevant’ (cited in Drezner 2004: 481). The internet, it is held, evades the 
jurisdiction of any one government, and attempts to impose regulatory restrictions 
will not only be undermined by network architecture but also suffer the unintended 
consequence of encouraging evasion and subterfuge of ever more ingenious kinds 
(Murray 2007; Tambini et al. 2008). Moreover, international bodies find it near-
impossible to sustain consensus, and they lack the power of nation-states to enforce 
compliance or punish transgression. 
 
Two further readings are also possible. One is that ‘we’ do not intend to regulate the 
internet because there is no need to regulate it – in short, because there is no problem. 
It is here that the range of child welfare professionals – children’s charities, teachers 
and educationalists, clinicians, parenting organizations, social workers and law 
enforcement - have focused their arguments, marshalling evidence to scope the nature, 
incidence and severity of online harm. A series of comprehensive evidence reviews 
undermine any claim that the internet poses no risk to children (Muir 2005; O'Connell 
and Bryce 2006; Byron 2008; Internet Safety Technical Task Force 2008). Having 
reviewed the evidence available in Europe, the EU (European Union) Kids Online 
network, which I direct for the European Commission (EC) Safer Internet 
Programme, classified online risks (and opportunities) so as to clarify future 
directions for public policy interventions and, especially, to transcend the over-simple 
rhetoric of both child-as-victim and child-as-digital-native (or indeed, child-as-
villain). 
 
First, we distinguished content risks in which the child encounters unwelcome or 
inappropriate content, from contact risks in which the child becomes a participant in 
risky personal communication (Hasebrink, Livingstone and Haddon 2009). Content 
risks arise because little regulation restricts the distribution of harmful websites 
(compare with the commonplace regulation of television, film and print). Thus 
children encounter more diverse and extreme content online than from other/older 
media. Surveys in Europe suggest one in four teenagers have encountered online 
pornography (though little is known of the nature of this material) and one in three 
have encountered online hate or violent content (Livingstone and Haddon 2009). 
Contact risks arise because little regulation restricts who can be in touch with anyone 
else online, and they are exacerbated by the ease with which age can be disguised 
online and the difficulty of ensuring privacy for personal information. While evidence 
is growing that risky contacts may expose children to harmful online experiences 
(e.g., sexual harassment through ab/use of webcams; National Campaign to Support 
Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy 2008),
7
 public concern focuses on the likelihood that 
online communication with new contacts (whether labelled ‘strangers’ or ‘friends’) 
results in abusive meetings offline. EU Kids Online found that one in ten European 
teenagers has gone to a meeting with a contact s/he first met online, though very few 
of these result in harm. Some British (Child Exploitation and Online Protection 
Centre, CEOP 2009) and American (Wolak, Finkelhor, Mitchell and Ybarra 2008) 
research suggests that the incidence of online grooming resulting in offline crimes 
against minors is rising.
8
 
 
 6 
With the explosion of user-generated content, some hosted on professional, 
commercial websites (e.g., social networking, gaming or blogging sites) and some 
circulated peer-to-peer (e.g., via email, instant messaging or newsgroups), the 
distinction between content and contact is blurring. Thus a third category of risk is 
proposed, that of conduct among peers: to understand these risks we must position the 
child as an actor who contributes to online risk, deliberately or unwittingly, as part of 
his or her peer-to-peer engagement. Attention has especially focused here on 
cyberbullying (Smith, Mahdavi, Carvalho and Tippett 2006; Shariff and Churchill 
2010), estimated by EU Kids Online to affect one in five teenagers (as victims, and 
fewer as perpetrators although – challenging for policy-makers – both roles may be 
taken by the same child; Wolak et al. 2008). 
  
Despite a fast-growing evidence base regarding online risk to children, the evidence 
remains contested and the methodologies available are imperfect, this impeding the 
judgements of scale, reach and severity necessary if policy is to be proportionate in 
balancing competing demands (Lobe, Livingstone and Haddon 2007). Nonetheless, 
the evidence is no less robust than for many other areas of risk for children (Madge 
and Barker 2007), where regulatory protections are taken for granted. Recently, the 
evidence for content, contact and conduct risks to children on the internet led the 
European Union to endorse the ministerial Prague Declaration in April 2009, setting 
out ‘a new European approach for a safer internet for children’. This advocates a 
‘holistic’ cooperation across countries, including the promotion of ‘a safer online 
environment by fostering and assessing private sector self-regulatory initiatives, and 
by supporting initiatives providing parental control tools as well as positive content 
for children’ (Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU 2009: 7). A range of 
existing and new policy initiatives are thereby brought together, albeit mainly reliant 
on the cooperation of individual Member States and/or European-level self-regulatory 
activities (notably, as coordinated by the Directorate-General Information Society’s 
Safer Internet Programme; see Reid 2009). 
 
Of course, it is the fourth reading that is most plausible - not that we shouldn’t or 
can’t or see no need to regulate the internet but that we will not regulate it, because 
the commercial interests at stake are substantial and, while international in scale, 
profits largely accrue to certain dominant nation-states. In 2005, Jowell (Department 
for Culture, Media and Sport 2005: np) gave a speech to the industry that exemplified 
this reading: 
 
‘We don't want to use a sledge-hammer to crack a nut … Creativity and 
enterprise can't flourish if they are beset by reams of red tape. … Regulation 
has to be proportionate, and take into account the opinions and needs of the 
businesses it is trying to regulate….And we should also remember that the 
international community can only do so much’. 
  
So, while the first reading treats the internet as a particular case of speech, the second 
treats it as too elusive for national regulation and the third as offering only a dubious 
case for intervention, this fourth argument treats the internet as any other business, a 
source of both innovation and revenue that demands a liberalized market not to be 
hampered by ‘red tape’. Just as the British government resisted the more restrictive 
proposals of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (so as to liberalize 
communication markets), in relation to the internet too, Britain and America appear to 
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lead the Western argument against regulation. On the other hand, the recent 
establishment of a UK Council for Child Internet Safety reveals British Government 
support for compensatory efforts towards concerted and effective self-regulation. The 
Family Online Safety Institute, a multi-stakeholder alliance of mainly industry 
players, primarily but not only based in the US, is seeking similar support. Also 
noteworthy of coming changes are the Department of Commerce’s Online Safety and 
Technical Working Group, whose subcommittees on pornography, data retention, 
parental controls and consumer online safety education are due to report in June 
2010,
9
 and the Federal Communications Commission’s notice of inquiry issued in 
October 2009 on ‘empowering parents and protecting children in an evolving media 
landscape’ (Federal Communications Commission 2009: np). 
 
‘Of course, the internet has always been regulated’ (Tambini et al. 2008: 5), in 
recognition of the limitations of the above readings (see Lessig 1999). First, there 
have always been legitimate restrictions on freedom of speech (even in the US – for 
example, the dissemination of child sexual abuse images), these attracting more 
attention with the expansion in hostile and harmful speech in peer-to-peer networks. 
Second, there is growing optimism that international organizations can cooperate to 
good effect in shaping the internet’s global infrastructure (witness the increasing 
interest in and support for the Internet Governance Forum, or the 2009 shift of the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) from American to 
international management; see chapter by Klein in this volume). Third, there is 
growing evidence that online experiences may harm the vulnerable, including but not 
only children, this requiring greater care over the interests of ordinary users. Fourth, 
there are growing calls for regulation from business as well as third sector and state 
actors to impose greater obligations on online service providers so as to ensure online 
transactions are secure, copyright infringements are enforced, personal data is well-
managed and brands have their reputations protected. 
 
Children’s Rights Offline and Online 
 
‘The child/media relationship is an entry point into the wide and multifaceted 
world of children and their rights – to education, freedom of expression, play, 
identity, health, dignity and self-respect, protection … in every aspect of child 
rights, in every element of the life of a child, the relationship between children 
and the media plays a role’ (United Nations Children’s Fund, UNICEF 1999: 
np). 
 
Principled arguments against regulatory interference in relation to either or both of the 
global market and adult freedom of speech have been met with equally principled 
arguments in support of children’s rights, concerning both their rights online and the 
implications of the internet for their rights offline. The UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (United Nations 1989), ratified by all countries but Somalia and the US, 
asserts the rights of all those under eighteen years old across all dimensions of 
children’s lives, including both positive (enabling) and negative (protective) 
communication-related rights (Hamelink 2008). Ten years on, UNICEF (1999) 
asserted the specific relevance of this rights agenda to the media in its ‘Oslo 
Challenge’ above. In a digital age, these rights – of freedom of expression and 
association, to beneficial material in one’s own language, to privacy and to protection 
from harmful material – undoubtedly extend online as well as offline.10 One way 
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forward would be to establish a Children’s Internet Charter (Livingstone 2009a) to 
mirror the earlier Children’s Television Charter. Relatedly, in 2007 the Council of 
Europe advocated, as an extension of the notion of public service from broadcasting 
to the internet:
 11 
 
‘The concept of public service value of the Internet, understood as people’s 
significant reliance on the Internet as an essential tool for their everyday 
activities (communication, information, knowledge, commercial transactions) 
and the resulting legitimate expectation that Internet services are accessible 
and affordable, secure, reliable and ongoing’ (Council of Europe 2007: np). 
Tangible initiatives in support of media or digital literacies (Livingstone 2008;  
 
Frau-Meigs and Torrent 2009) also advance positive communication rights online, as 
would increased provision resulting from the EC Safer Internet Programme’s call for 
more ‘positive content’ online (European Commission 2009).12 Without being po-
faced about what’s good for children, and noting that children may disagree with 
adults when evaluating online opportunities, it is both important and timely to call for 
content, contact and conduct that benefits children – whether this is specifically online 
public service content (i.e., provided by a public service institution and evaluated for 
being diverse, indigenous, high quality and stimulating) or the more mixed provision 
of opportunities for content, contact and conduct that enable children’s online 
interaction and communication. How children’s digital rights and opportunities may 
be implemented remains unclear, though an audit of what is available to and 
accessible by children in different countries and life contexts would be a useful step. 
  
An important feature of the Convention on the Rights of the Child is that it brings 
together children’s positive and negative rights. Empirically, as noted earlier, 
opportunities and risks tend to be positively associated, although it also seems that the 
more children are provided with ‘positive content’ the less they surf randomly and so 
encounter online risks (Bauwens et al. 2009).
13
 Theoretically, the linking of 
opportunities and risks is central to what Beck has termed ‘the risk 
society’(1986/2005). On the internet, this linkage is particularly difficult to manage. 
Not only do children engage in both ‘approved’ and ‘disapproved’ activities, but often 
these are the same activities – to take up an opportunity, one may encounter a risk; as 
in the offline world, ‘twas ever thus. This may be exacerbated or ameliorated by the 
environment in which children grow up: both urban and online environments are 
largely designed for and populated by adults - their affordances are never neutral and 
rarely child-friendly (after all, the early founders of the internet arguably never 
imagined that children would become users, and in substantial numbers). On an 
individual level, the close relation between opportunities and risks is significant, for 
as child psychologists observe, children learn by extending themselves, stretching 
their capacities and encountering both the unexpectedly beneficial and the 
problematic in order to gain resilience (Vygotsky1934/1986). The more children are 
to learn online, the more they must gain resilience in managing the online 
environment. 
 
Internet Regulation – Emerging Principles and Practices 
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‘Because the UK’s media sector and other creative industries are the jewel in 
our economic crown […] the best approach is to rely as far as possible on self-
regulation’ (Jowell 2006: np). 
  
Especially but not only in Western advanced industrial democracies, the widely 
favored solution to the challenges of internet regulation is self-regulation, this 
requiring cooperation across a heterogeneous array of hardware, software and content 
providers, largely from the private sector but including significant public sector 
elements. This is consistent with the wider shift in regulatory regimes from (direct or 
top-down) government to dispersed and often indirect governance characteristic of 
neoliberalism (Freedman 2008). As Donges (2007: 326) observes,  
 
‘governance refers to the dynamic structure of rules between actors that are 
linked in different networks and permanently forced to negotiate, without a 
center that has the power to command and control’.  
 
While such a dynamic process of regulation has some advantages, as noted below, it 
does make for piecemeal policy-making across a heterogeneous array of organizations 
and alliances.
14
 In the case of internet regulation, this renders it hard to assess 
whether, as critical accounts of the struggles between industry and educators/third 
sector would question, self-regulation is serving the long-term interests of children as 
much as it does those of the private sector. 
 
Usefully, self-regulation avoids the problematic ‘we’ that so easily undermines the 
rationale for internet regulation – for who are ‘we’ to decide to restrict online 
activities, especially when the ‘we’ who decides may not equate to the ‘we’ in whose 
interests such decisions are made? In an age when public trust seems to elude 
governments, it seems expedient to pass the regulatory task to the internet industry 
itself, with slippery matters of offence, values and conduct to be managed through 
company policy, customer care relations and/or technological means. The ‘we’ who 
regulates therefore, is the industry acting, as it may be trusted so to do, out of self-
interest (to protect the integrity of its service, the confidence of its customer base and 
the reputation of its brand) rather than in the public (or children’s) interest, though 
such interests need not be incompatible. 
 
Provided such self-regulation is effective or, failing that, transparent in its efforts (i.e., 
provided the customer can detect and evaluate the regulatory tools and procedures 
implemented by the provider), then ‘we’ the public are (supposedly) free to choose 
the services that best support our desired balance of opportunities and risks. But if the 
effectiveness and/or transparency of self-regulation are not established, regulatory 
alternatives could and, arguably, should be sought. Scott (2001: 3) defines the relation 
between regulation and social control as encompassing: 
 
‘(1) some sort of standard, goal, or set of values against which perceptions of 
what is happening within the environment to be controlled are compared 
through (2) some mechanism of monitoring or feedback which in turn triggers 
(3) some form of action which attempts to align the controlled variables, as 
they are perceived by the monitoring component with the goal component’. 
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Traditionally, these goals are set by the state, to advance the interests of public or 
market or both, while monitoring and compliance roles have been undertaken by a 
command-and-control style regulator. Hence: 
 
‘For classical regulation the goal component is represented typically by some 
legal rule or standard, the feedback component by monitoring by a regulatory 
agency, government department or self-regulatory organisation and the 
realignment component by the application of sanctions for breach of 
standards’ (Scott 2001: 3). 
 
As consensus grows that top-down supervisory regulation (usually by governments or 
their appointed agents) is no longer optimal, especially in the fast-globalizing media 
and communication sector, the jury is out over the relative merits of co- and self-
regulation, the two main alternatives. While the US favors a mix of legislation and 
self-regulation (Montgomery 2007) and Europe favors co-regulation (or what 
Christou and Simpson (2006) term ‘public-private transnational governance’), the UK 
prefers a strategy of self-regulation (Tambini et al. 2008). Held (2007: 357) defines 
co-regulation in terms of the following criteria, emphasizing the vital role of the state 
in ensuring the legitimacy and effectiveness of regulatory bodies: 
 
‘(1) The system is established to achieve public policy goals targeted at social 
processes. (2) There is a legal connection between the non-state regulatory 
system and the state regulation. (3) The state leaves discretionary power to a 
non-state regulatory system. (4) The state uses regulatory resources to 
influence the outcome of the regulatory process (to guarantee the fulfilment of 
the regulatory goals)’. 
 
By implication, self-regulation occurs when only the first and third criteria are in 
place. The second and fourth criteria afford pressure points for the state, in addition to 
the threat (often discursively salient in today’s governance regimes) that legislation 
will be introduced should self- or co-regulation prove insufficient to achieve desired 
public policy goals. But even the first and third points are not straightforward: who is 
to set the goals for self-regulation and how it is to be managed and evaluated remain 
the subject of both explicit and behind-the-scenes contestation. This is unsurprising 
given conflicting interests across public and private sectors and given that cooperation 
is required across national and international levels of organization. 
 
Since self-regulation offers a means of dispersing power from the centralized state to 
a host of institutions with governance responsibilities at all levels from local to global 
(Jessop 2002), one crucial consequence is that ‘it is increasingly difficult to uphold a 
clear distinction between public and private governance arrangements’ (Zürn and 
Koenig-Archibugi 2006: 251, emphasis in original). It is achieved in part by the shift 
from government through explicit laws to discursive (self-)governance by multiple 
stakeholders through the operation of codes, norms, standards, guidelines and the like 
(Lunt and Livingstone 2007). The value of a ‘talking shop’, which some (non-
binding) organizations – both international (e.g., Council of Europe) or multi-
stakeholder (e.g., Internet Governance Forum) and with or without self-regulatory 
responsibilities – are sometimes denigrated for being, can be recognized better once it 
is understood that as governments step back from state control, the self-regulation that 
takes its place must be achieved through discursive means (rather than enforced 
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compliance). Consider the task of building a consensus if norms are to be voluntarily 
adhered to, as in the European Union’s Guidance on Social Networking Sites; or the 
UK’s Home Secretary’s Task Force for Child Protection on the Internet;15 or the 
Internet Watch Foundation’s positive promotion of organizations that implement the 
Clean Feed blocking of illegal child sexual abuse images (IWF 2009). 
 
One much-cited argument in favor of self-regulation is that industry can keep pace 
with technological developments more effectively than governments (which face a 
‘knowledge gap’, as Schulz and Held (2006) put it, in the information sector, 
including regulator ignorance of the full array of entities to be regulated). The Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) of the Family Online Safety Institute in the US observes 
that:  
‘as we catch up with and provide solutions to technologies and content that 
could prove harmful to kids, new devices, new strange meeting places spring 
up and thwart our earlier efforts’ (Balkam 2008: 4).  
 
One example of the need for constant updating of regulation, recently raised by the 
European non-governmental organization Alliance for Child Safety Online,
16
 is how 
quickly the 2007 European Framework for Safer Mobile Use by Younger Teenagers 
and Children, albeit now implemented across 81 operators in 26 Member States 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2009), became outdated, failing to anticipate the risk of 
children being tracked using new generation location services (currently) outside the 
control of mobile operators (via Global Positioning System or GPS, wifi hotspots or 
Open Cell ID). Another is the continuing struggles between Facebook and its users 
over the appropriate management of privacy settings, illustrating the tension between 
making personal information public (to enable connections), as favored by Facebook 
and many of its adult users, and the contrary desire to keep personal information 
private (to enable intimacy), as favored by some adults, most parents and those 
concerned to protect children. Here it is generally deemed more effective for the 
industry and users to negotiate an appropriate balance rather than require regulators to 
intervene, though the digital literacy and social coordination skills required for this 
should not be underestimated.
17
 
  
A second claim made by advocates of self-regulation is that the potential for multi-
stakeholder self-determination and public participation are commensurately enhanced 
(although Schulz and Held (2006) argue the contrary). The discursive tone (if not 
necessarily the actual practice) of the emerging regulatory regime is illustrated by the 
United States’ Department of Commerce in relation to the ‘multi-stakeholder, private 
sector led, bottom-up policy development model’ represented by ICANN.18 As 
Künzler (2007: 354) observes, self-regulation works best if the following are in place: 
 
‘(1) independence of self-regulation organizations from the regulated industry; 
(2) acceptance of self-regulation by the regulated companies and 
professionals; (3) sufficient funding and personnel resources; (4) clear 
definition of the procedures and goals of the self-regulation organisation and 
its transparency to the public’. 
 
Regarding this last point, national and international organizations increasingly, it 
seems, conduct public consultations on their remit, codes and achievements, also 
facilitating public attitude research, stakeholder meetings and public events. Although 
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there are both principled and practical benefits to transparency and public 
deliberation, it is often observed that take-up from diverse and new voices can be 
disappointing, with a group of ‘usual suspects’ attending each event to express views 
that reflect and promote rather than revise their original position, and with few cases 
of change resulting from wider public participation. Doubts occur regarding the 
former points also, with the requirement for independence of the regulator from its 
sector seemingly elusive in the domain of children’s online safety. This may be 
because the next two points (acceptance and funding) mitigate against such 
independence: an industry that provides the resources and the legitimacy for a 
regulator generally wishes to shape its work. 
 
Take the case of the UK’s Internet Watch Foundation, described as ‘an independent, 
self-regulatory organisation’ (IWF 2009a)19 which provides a hotline and notice-and-
take-down service for potentially illegal online content (generally, child sexual abuse 
images), part funded by the EC Safer Internet Programme and part of an international 
network of similar hotlines. Although the IWF is generally seen as a successful 
regulator, it is arguable that public legitimacy was not achieved, indeed was much 
contested internally and externally, until the Sexual Offences Act 2003 established a 
‘memorandum of understanding’20 which officially recognized the organization’s 
public policy goals (i.e., for child protection, thereby also precluding ‘remit creep’ 
into other kinds of speech, including that which is harmful but legal). Also important 
was the potential liability to prosecution of companies not operating the take-down 
service or, later, not centrally blocking sites listed by the IWF as potentially illegal.
21
 
In other words – an organization that proclaims itself self-regulatory nonetheless 
requires, in Held’s (2007: 357) terms, ‘a legal connection between the non-state 
regulatory system and the state regulation’; further, ‘the state uses regulatory 
resources to influence the outcome of the regulatory process’ – a case of co-
regulation, in short. 
 
Without a co-regulatory framework, it appears that not only legitimacy but also 
independent monitoring and compliance/enforcement are weakened in the move from 
government to governance. The industry’s reluctance to subject itself to independent 
monitoring or evaluation of the effectiveness of its regulatory initiatives is a persistent 
feature of deliberation in this field. As Brown (in press) observes,  
 
‘while these [self-regulatory] schemes are more flexible and less burdensome 
than statutory regulation, they commonly lack the procedural fairness and 
protection for fundamental rights that are encouraged by independent judicial 
and parliamentary scrutiny’.  
 
Nonetheless, the European Commission is undertaking some independent evaluation 
and monitoring – examples include the European mobile framework 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2009) and the effectiveness of domestic filtering tools 
(DeLoitte and European Commission 2008). Monitoring the 2009 Safer Social 
Networking Principles for the EU (European Commission 2009a), to which most 
social networking services are signatories, proved more controversial – perhaps 
because many of the global players (e.g., Facebook, MySpace, Bebo, etc.) have their 
headquarters in the US. The UK Council for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS) has 
found reaching agreement on the independent monitoring of codes of conduct or 
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guidance difficult, although its strategy statement of December 2009 does promise 
that: 
 
‘we will make sure that a review of how we are using each set of guidance is 
carried out periodically …reviews will be carried out by someone impartial 
with the right understanding and experience’ (UKCCIS 2009: 11).  
 
It adds that this is a matter of ‘effective self-regulation’, though it remains uncertain 
how effective such reviews will be. Thus, although the UK claims to lead in European 
and even wider international deliberations, having demonstrated the merits of multi-
stakeholder cooperation to achieve self-regulation, there are signs that the European 
Commission and other international bodies may take the lead in pressuring national 
governments and indeed, major companies (Reid 2009). 
 
Regulating Contact, Content and Conduct Risks Online 
 
How, in practice, are online risks to children being regulated? Recalling EU Kids 
Online’s threefold classification of online risks to children, as adopted by the UK’s 
Byron Review (‘Safer Children in a Digital World’, commissioned by the Prime 
Minister; Byron 2008), it seems that contact risks, especially online grooming and 
paedophile activity, concern phenomena for which society has little or no tolerance 
and which are widely addressed by criminal law (Palmer and Stacey 2004; Quayle 
and Taylor 2005; Finkelhor 2008). Distributing photographs of child sexual abuse or 
grooming a child online in order to abuse him or her sexually is internationally 
regarded as unacceptable, though these are not illegal – and certainly not effectively 
prevented - everywhere. However, legislative solutions are generally sought only for 
high risk circumstances, for their effect is to constrain freedoms by making a wider set 
of actions illegal than would inevitably result in harm if permitted: for instance, 
children make many contacts online and only a few result in harmful encounters, 
albeit these may be disastrous for their victims.
22
 Indeed, most online contacts afford 
positive experiences for children, valuable as part of their ‘freedom of assembly’. 
  
It is this, over and above the challenges of international law enforcement, which 
complicates the regulatory task of minimizing contact risks to children, for it cannot 
easily be ascertained in advance which contacts are benign and which are harmful. 
Nor does research as yet pinpoint the particularly vulnerable children from among the 
many sufficiently resilient to avoid and/or cope with potential contact risks. Nor 
finally, are the available solutions unproblematic: is it best to scare parents into 
checking on their child’s personal contacts, or to try to teach children complicated 
technical means of protecting their privacy, or to ensure the location of ‘report abuse’ 
buttons on every social networking and instant messaging service, or to require online 
providers to pre- or post-moderate all chat involving children, or… the list of 
possibilities could be continued, and few have yet been evaluated. 
  
By contrast with contact risks, ‘content is by far the most contentious area of media 
policy’ (Freedman 2008: 122). Difficult questions of community standards and 
cultural values are vastly exacerbated in a transnational context (Millwood Hargrave, 
and Livingstone 2009; Preston 2009). Yet there is widespread public concern that, for 
example, explicit images of heterosexual, homosexual, teenage, violent or bestial 
sexual acts are readily accessible via a simple Google search (Waskul 2004). 
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Although traditionally tolerated in print or film, children’s access to such content has 
traditionally been restricted, whether through regulatory or social means. Already in 
the short history of the internet, regulators and industry have experimented with 
diverse initiatives for managing the conditions of access to inappropriate content, 
searching for the online equivalent of these familiar (and largely uncontroversial) 
means of managing content offline. Yet whether white lists, black lists, walled 
gardens, international content rating systems, more or less subtle filters applied at 
different points in the distribution chain or, last but not least, outright censorship, 
most initiatives have failed. An early failure was the attempt to establish a Dot Kids 
domain (under the US domain – .kids.us).23 Although some countries’ attempts to 
build children’s walled gardens or portals have been more successful, especially 
among younger children (e.g., the German portal fragFinn connects to 4,000 sites and 
is widely used by children). 
  
To be effective, such initiatives depend on considerable resources (to pre-moderate 
and update linked sites, and to mount public awareness campaigns so parents and 
children know of them). Resources are more readily forthcoming in large language 
communities and when provision is commercially rather than publicly funded, this 
tending to trade personal safety (from sexual or violent content) against children’s 
freedom from commercial messages. Given ever-present resistance to censorship, 
content regulation is increasingly focused on the end user, notably through the 
provision of parental tools. Although, as Thierer (2009) observes, these depend both 
on effective design (neither over- nor under-blocking) and on ‘good’ parenting (i.e., 
assuming parents are not incompetent, overburdened, negligent nor ill-intentioned) 
(see also Oswell 2008). A particular and persistent problem is that of age verification: 
paraphrasing the widely cited New Yorker cartoon that nobody would know from your 
online activities if you were a dog, it is also the case that nobody knows if you are a 
child (notwithstanding various failed attempts, technical or regulatory, to enforce one 
to make such a distinction; Thierer 2009). Since children’s preference is to spend time 
on generalist sites
24
 where their presence is not generally detectable, their online 
experiences (including possible harm) are shaped by the commercial practices of 
major global players who are not easily subjected to the jurisdiction of individual 
nation-states. 
 
‘Sticks and stones may break your bones…’. Is it the case that, as the playground 
rhyme would have it, ‘words can never hurt you’? As the risk agenda is broadened to 
encompass not only how adult society may harm children but also how children may 
attack each other (and, on occasion, victimize themselves), conduct risks raise exactly 
this question. For example, bullying has long been understood as including physical 
as well as verbal harassment among peers – what does this mean for cyberbullying? 
Beyond the important point that online bullying is often continuous with offline 
bullying (i.e., the bully pursues his or her victim across contexts on and offline), it is 
increasingly acknowledged that cyberbullying differs from offline bullying insofar as 
it simultaneously affords anonymity to the bully and publicity to the humiliation of 
the victim (Smith, Mahdavi, Carvalho and Tippett 2006). 
 
Cyberbullying is exacerbated by the ease of manipulating visual images, the 
extraordinary rapidity by which these may be spread, and the reach of such messages 
into the victim’s private and supposedly safe places (his or her bedroom, on the 
phone, at home; boyd 2008). Add to this young people’s reliance on the internet to 
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conduct their social relations, and the facility with which social networking sites bring 
together multiple forms of online communication, enabling all forms of contact from 
the most intimate to the widest of friendship circles, including hostile and abusive 
peer communication as part of the wider picture. In regulatory terms, conduct risks are 
the least amenable, for they occur peer-to-peer, not necessarily evident to observing 
(or supervising) adults. Thus, most regulatory efforts focus on raising awareness 
(among parents), encouraging considerate codes of conduct (among children), 
facilitating peer support (via mentoring) and providing sources of support (help-lines). 
In relation to conduct risks, the main effort is thus directed at making young people 
themselves, rather than industry, self-regulating, albeit with support from the state 
(and, acting on its behalf, schools). 
 
Integrating Diverse Policy Initiatives 
 
How might these currently piecemeal initiatives come together? And how might they 
tread the fraught path between the Scylla and Charybdis of top-down intervention by 
governments and laissez-faire reliance on the wisdom of users, the general public. 
One way is to conceive of improving safety less through the imposition of rules and 
regulations as by building safety considerations into the design and construction of the 
online environment (as already occurs in the offline environment, where this approach 
is established in engineering, urban planning, health and safety at work, and other 
domains). This seeks to anticipate the risks likely to be encountered (or even 
occasioned) by users and so incorporates risk and safety considerations into the design 
stages of innovation, planning and manufacture. Applied to the internet, what we 
might then call a policy of ‘safety by design’ recognizes that the public (including 
parents, children and those whose activities might harm children, intentionally or 
otherwise) is engaged with an environment that has been substantially planned for, 
designed, paid for and institutionally supported in particular ways, according to 
particular anticipated uses and in order to further particular interests (Mansell and 
Silverstone 1996). In other words, the online environment could have been and could 
yet be arranged otherwise, possibly reducing risk without disproportionate cost to the 
freedoms and opportunities of either children or adults. 
 
In internet safety policy for children, this is to go beyond the widespread analogy of 
road safety (e.g., Criddle 2006; UKCCIS 2009), namely that just as society teaches 
children to cross roads safely it could teach them to use the internet safely. Rather, 
safety depends on a more fundamental interdependence of users and environments: 
children can only learn to cross roads designed with safety embedded into their 
physical design (traffic lights, width restrictions, road bumps, marked crossing points) 
and social rules (consider the public’s familiarity with the rules of the road and 
society’s enforcement of those rules). We do not teach children to cross a four lane 
highway or an unlit road at night or a road on which the cars have no vehicle testing, 
insurance or drink/drive laws. Thus, one must extend the road safety analogy to 
encompass that of town planning (Livingstone 2009). Only in the context of a planned 
environment, where children’s playgrounds do not open onto major roads, sex shops 
are not sited next to schools, and commercial areas are regulated differently from 
residential ones, do we teach children how to treat strangers or travel where they need 
to go or with whom they can play freely. Interestingly, this balance of regulation and 
education is not generally resisted as a restriction on adult freedoms or as sacrificing 
the market to child protection – perhaps, because offline the planning system evolved 
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over generations, its principles and practices being gradually embedded in everyday 
‘common sense’. 
 
Online, the regulatory regime is being developed much faster, permitting little time to 
attend to competing views, let practices settle down or wait for unintended 
consequences to unfold. Yet many of the regulatory practices referred to in this 
chapter are, as for town planning, attempts to manage conditions of accessibility – in 
this case, designing into websites and services enablers and constraints on what (or 
who) children (and others) can access and how. Examples, as noted throughout this 
chapter, include provision of filters, specification of child-friendly default settings, 
age verification systems, content rating and labelling, design standards, opt-in/opt-out 
points (e.g., for ‘adult’ content), and many more. Another aspect of the town planning 
analogy is important: when planning regulations are contested, there is recourse to an 
independent, transparent and public process of management and arbitration, including 
published codes of practice and a clear appeals process, whereby competing interests 
are fought out. Online, equivalent citizen protections are not yet widely in place. And 
even though large companies invest heavily in ‘customer care’ procedures, public 
accountability regarding their complaint handling, filtering decisions or moderation 
processes is rarely available to scrutiny. Sceptics will note further, that offline, 
planning processes are far from infallible – road accidents still happen, and crime, 
including crimes against children, are widespread. Nonetheless, such processes are 
vital to the infrastructure of society and, where lacking online, most countries hope or 
plan to introduce them.
25
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The internet promises wonderful opportunities for education, communication, 
participation and creativity. Yet the very same medium represents the means of 
bringing into the privacy of the home the very worst of society. This chapter has 
traced some of the debates, decisions and dilemmas encountered by diverse 
stakeholders across state, business and third sector as they acknowledge that 
children’s experience of the internet and, therefore, for this reason (among others), the 
internet itself is being and must be regulated, in one way or another, albeit often with 
new problems arising just as old ones are resolved.
26
 As we have seen, in these 
debates ‘children’ figure in several ways. Some arguments are traditional: throughout 
the history of media technologies, children’s distinctive vulnerabilities and 
consequent need for protection against media harms have always been prominent, 
though the impulse to regulate has often mutated into efforts to educate  (i.e., to 
promote media literacy; Drotner 1992). Some arguments are new: with the advent of 
interactive media, the user’s agency is better recognized – though as a result, 
children’s competence may be exaggerated (- ‘digital natives’, so called) or seen as 
dangerous (- ‘hooligans’ online as, supposedly, offline).27 Some arguments are largely 
rhetorical: ‘children’ may be introduced into the public fray not so much to represent 
their interests as to provide a morally acceptable face for censorship (for restrictions 
on freedom of expression introduced to protect children may subsequently be used to 
restrict other forms of speech). 
 
Although child protection is still sometimes framed as a limitation on adult rights to 
expression, legitimate or otherwise, it is a matter of children’s rights, and when the 
rights of one segment of society conflict with the rights of another, some qualification 
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of absolute rights is the inevitable outcome. The policy dilemma then, concerns the 
appropriate balance among competing rights.  
 
I have argued against any simple confrontation between adult freedoms and child 
protection, a confrontation in which children’s rights – for both empowerment and 
protection – are unlikely to be supported. In refocusing instead on the more difficult 
balance between empowerment and protection in advancing children’s interests 
specifically (though potentially wider public interests too), I have suggested that a 
more nuanced and proportionate approach to complex and competing rights and 
interests may emerge. Nonetheless, in certain regards it may be that conflicts between 
adult freedoms and child protection will remain, and in such cases it must be 
acknowledged there are as yet no ready answers. 
 
As we also have seen, regulatory regimes are moving towards a ‘softer’, more indirect 
approach that disperses the role of the state by establishing more accountable national 
and transnational regulatory bodies, by engaging civil society in processes of 
governance and by encouraging in the ‘responsible’ or ‘empowered’ citizen the new 
task of personal risk assessment – ‘the need to adopt a calculative prudent personal 
relation to fate now conceived in terms of calculable dangers and avertable risks’ 
(Rose 1996: 58). But, countering enthusiasm for self-regulation, we have observed 
good reasons to support co-regulation even though, as Schulz and Held (2006: 63) 
caution, ‘the effectiveness of the approach has to be examined in each case’. Nor is 
legislation always avoided: in the case of efforts to eradicate paid-for and peer-to-peer 
transactions in images of child sexual abuse, for instance, several countries have 
implemented specific legislation over and above the generic principle that, since those 
perpetrating crimes and those harmed by them live within national jurisdictions, ‘what 
is illegal offline is illegal online’ (Van Dijk 2006).28 Each of these regulatory 
solutions has been much debated, for ‘not only have media and culture industries 
become increasingly central in the economies of European countries, they have also 
become the terrain of contestation and consensus regarding self-governance and 
cultural identity’ (Sarikakis 2007: 14). 
 
In concluding this chapter, I must acknowledge the dangers of telling history from the 
midst of events, without the benefit of hindsight. Still, it is tempting to do so now that 
child online safety appears finally, though hardly centrally or uncontroversially, on 
the agenda of the Internet Governance Forum, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the International Telecommunication Union, the 
European Commission and the Council of Europe, as well as many national 
governments around the world.
29
 A recent survey of policies in place suggests 
considerable diversity in governance regimes worldwide, although more work is 
required to reach conclusions about whether regulation is effective in meeting public 
policy goals.
30
 It seems, at least in developed countries, there may come a time when 
international models of regulation will influence, rather than merely recognize, 
coordinate and/or respond to, the regulatory regimes of individual nation-states. For 
researchers tracking children’s experiences, both beneficial and harmful, for 
children’s welfare and rights activists, and for parents and children themselves, these 
shifts pose new challenges regarding participation, transparency and accountability of 
the regulatory process as they - we - seek to understand the emerging mediated 
landscape and to identify the possible pressure points for change. 
 
 18 
 
References 
 
Alao, A. O., Soderberg, M., Pohl, E. L., and Alao, A. L. (2006) “Cybersuicide: 
Review of the role of the Internet on suicide”, Cyberpsychology & Behavior, 
9(4): 489-493. 
All Party Parliamentary Communications Group (2009)  “Can we keep our hands off 
the net?” Report of an Inquiry by the All Party Parliamentary 
Communications Group.  London: apComms. 
Balkam, S. (2008) State of Online Safety Report. Washington, DC: Family Online 
Safety Institute. 
Barak, A. (2005) “Sexual harassment on the Internet”, Social Science Computer 
Review, 23(1): 77-92. 
Bauwens, J., Lobe, B., Segers, K., and Tsaliki, L. (2009) “A shared responsibility -- 
Similarities and differences in the factors that shape online risk assessment for 
children in Europe”, Journal of Children and Media, 3(4): 316 - 330. 
Beck, U. (1986/2005) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage 
Publications. 
Bennett, S., Maton, K., and Kervin, L. (2008) “The ‘digital natives’ debate: A critical 
review of the evidence”, British Journal of Educational Technology, 39(5): 
775-786. 
Bohman, J. (1991) New Philosophy of Social Science: Problems of Indeterminacy. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
boyd, d. (2008) “Why youth ♥ social network sites: The role of networked publics in 
teenage social life”, in D. Buckingham (ed) Youth, Identity, and Digital 
Media. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 119–142. 
Brown, I. (2008) “Internet filtering - be careful what you ask for”, in S. Kirca and L. 
Hanson (eds) Freedom and Prejudice: Approaches to Media and Culture. 
Istanbul: Bahcesehir University Press, pp. 74-91. 
Brown, I. (in press) “Internet self-regulation and fundamental rights”, Index on 
Censorship. 
Byron, T. (2008) Safer Children in a Digital World: The Report of the Byron Review. 
London: Department for Children, Schools and Families, and the Department 
for Culture, Media and Sport. 
Castells, M. (2002) The Internet Galaxy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
CEOP (2009) Strategic Overview 2008-2009. London: Child Exploitation and Online 
Protection Centre. 
Christou, G., and Simpson, S. (2006) “The internet and public-private governance in 
the European Union”, Journal of Public Policy, 26(1): 43-61. 
Collier, A. (2009) “School cyberbully wins free-speech case”, NetFamilyNews.org,, 
accessed 01/03/2010, http://www.netfamilynews.org/2009/12/school-
cyberbully-wins-free-speech-case.html .  
Collins, R., and Murroni, C. (1996) New Media, New Policies: Media and 
Communications Strategies for the Future. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Commons Hansard (2002) “House of Commons Hansard Debates for 3 Dec 2002 (pt 
14)”, accessed 01/01/2010, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo021203/debtext/21203-14.htm .  
Communications Consumer Panel (2009) Response of the Communications Consumer 
Panel to the Government’s consultation on legislation to tackle illegal peer-to-
peer file-sharing. London: Communications Consumer Panel, accessed 
 19 
03/01/2010, 
http://www.communicationsconsumerpanel.org.uk/Response%20to%20online
%20copyright%20infringement%20consultation.pdf  . 
ConnectSafely (2009) “Online safety 3.0: Empowering and protecting youth”, 
ConnectSafely.org, accessed 01/01/2010, 
http://www.connectsafely.org/Commentaries-Staff/online-safety-30-
empowering-and-protecting-youth.html . 
Council of Europe (2007) Building a Free and Safe Internet: Council of Europe 
Submission to the Internet Governance Forum, Rio de Janeiro, 12 to 15 
November 2007. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, accessed 03/01/2010, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dc/press/source/CoE%20submission%20to%20IGF_1008
07FINAL.doc . 
Council of Europe (2009) “The promotion of Internet and online media services 
appropriate for minors”, Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe. 
Strasbourg: Council of Europe, accessed 03/01/2010, 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta09/EREC1
882.htm . 
Criddle, L. (2006) Look Both Ways: Help Protect Your Family on the Internet. 
Redmond: Microsoft Press. 
Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU (2009) “Prague declaration: A new 
European approach for safer Internet for children” (20 April), Prague: 
Ministerial Conference ‘Safer Internet for Children – fighting together against 
illegal content and conduct on-line’, accessed 03/01/2010, 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/sip/docs/events/prague_decl.
pdf . 
Dahlgren, P., and Olsson, T. (2008) “Facilitating political participation: Young 
citizens, Internet and civic cultures”, in K. Drotner and S. Livingstone (eds) 
International Handbook of Children, Media and Culture. London: Sage 
Publications, pp. 493-507. 
Deloitte, and European Commission (2008) Safer Internet: Protecting Our Children 
on the Net Using Content Filtering and Parental Control Techniques: A 
Report Prepared for the Safer Internet Plus Programme. Belgium: Deloitte 
Enterprise Risk Services, accessed 03/01/2010, http://www.sip-
bench.eu/index.html . 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport (2005) “Tessa Jowell keynote speech to the 
Creative Economy conference”, London: Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport, assessed 01/01/2010, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.culture.gov.uk/global/
press_notices/archive_2005/creative_economy_conference.htm . 
Donges, P. (2007) “The new institutionalism as a theoretical foundation of media 
governance”, Communications: The European Journal of Communication 
Research, 32(3): 325-329. 
Drezner, D. W. (2004) “The global governance of the Internet: Bringing the State 
back in”, Political Science Quarterly, 119(3): 477-498. 
Drotner, K. (1992) “Modernity and media panics”, in M. Skovmand and K. C. 
Schroeder (eds) Media Cultures: Reappraising Transnational Media.  
London: Routledge, pp. 42-62. 
European Commission (2009) “Safer Internet Work Programme 2009”, Brussels: 
Commission of the European Communities, accessed 03/01/2010, 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/social_networking/eu_action
 20 
/selfreg/index_en.htm . 
European Commission (2009a) “Safer Social Networking Principles for the EU”, 
Brussels: European Commission, accessed 03/01/2010, 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/social_networking/docs/sn_p
rinciples.pdf . 
Federal Communications Commission (2008) “Children’s educational television”, 
Washington DC: FCC, accessed 01/01/2010, 
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/childtv.html . 
Federal Communications Commission (2009) “Notice of inquiry in the matter of 
‘Empowering Parents and Protecting Children in an Evolving Media 
Landscape’ ”, Washington DC: FCC, accessed 10/12/2009, 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-09-94A1.pdf . 
Finkelhor, D. (2008) Childhood Victimization: Violence, Crime, and Abuse in the 
Lives of Young People. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Frau-Meigs, D., and Torrent, J. (2009) “Media education policy: Towards a global 
rationale”, in D. Frau-Meigs and J. Torrent (eds) Mapping Media Education 
Policies in the World: Visions, Programmes and Challenges. New York: The 
United Nations-Alliance of Civilizations & Grupo Comunicar, pp. 15-21, 
accessed 03/01/2010, http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=28540&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html . 
Freedman, D. (2008) The Politics of Media Policy.  Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Govtrack.us (2008) “Broadband Data Improvement Act”, accessed 01/01/2010, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s110-1492 . 
Hamelink, C. J. (2008) “Children’s communication rights: Beyond intentions”, in K. 
Drotner and S. Livingstone (eds) International Handbook of Children, Media 
and Culture. London: Sage Publications, pp. 508-519. 
Hasebrink, U., Livingstone, S., and Haddon, L. (2009) Comparing Children’s Online 
Opportunities and Risks Across Europe: Cross-National Comparisons for EU 
Kids Online. Deliverable D3.2 for the EC Safer Internet plus programme 
(Second edition). London: EU Kids Online, accessed 
01/01/2010, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24368/ . 
Held, T. (2007). Co-regulation in European Union member states. Communications, 
32, 415-422. 
ICANN (2009) Affirmation of Commitments by the United States Department of 
Commerce and the Internet Corporation for Assigned names and Numbers. 
Washington, DC: Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, 
accessed 03/01/2010, http://www.icann.org/en/documents/affirmation-of-
commitments-30sep09-en.htm . 
International Telecommunication Union (2009) Child Online Protection. Geneva: 
International Telecommunication Union, accessed 03/01/2010, 
http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/cop/cop-brochure.pdf . 
Internet Crime Forum. (2000). Chat Wise, Street Wise: Children and Internet Chat 
Services. London: The Internet Crime Forum IRC sub-group. 
Internet Governance Forum (nd) “Dynamic coalition on child online safety”, Internet 
Governance Forum, accessed 01/01/2010, 
http://igf.wgig.org/cms/index.php/dynamic-coalitions/79-child-online-safety . 
Internet Safety Technical Task Force (ISTTF) (2008) Enhancing Child Safety and 
Online Technologies: Final Report of the ISTTF to the Multi-State Working 
Group on Social Networking of State Attorney Generals of the United States. 
Cambridge: Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard University. 
 21 
Ito, M., Horst, H., Bittanti, M., boyd, d., Herr-Stephenson, B., Lange, P. G., et al. 
(2008) Living and Learning with New Media: Summary of Findings from the 
Digital Youth Project. Chicago: The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur 
Foundation. 
IWF (2007) “Sex Offences Act 2003 memorandum of understanding”, Internet Watch 
Foundation, Cambridge: IWF, accessed 01/01/2010, 
http://www.iwf.org.uk/police/page.22.213.htm . 
IWF (2008) 2007 Annual and Charity Report. Cambridge: Internet Watch 
Foundation. 
IWF (2009) “IWF facilitation of the blocking initiative”, Internet Watch Foundation, 
Cambridge: IWF, accessed 01/01/2010, 
http://www.iwf.org.uk/public/page.148.htm . 
IWF (2009a) “IWF status”, Internet Watch Foundation, Cambridge: IWF, accessed 
01/01/2010, http://www.iwf.org.uk/public/page.103.549.htm .  
Jessop, B. (2002) The Future of the Capitalist State. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Jowell, T. (2006) “Speech to the Oxford Media Convention”, accessed 01/01/2010, 
http://www.ippr.org.uk/uploadedFiles/events/Tessa%20Jowell%20Speech.doc  
Kotler, S. (2009) “Cyberbullying Bill could ensnare free speech rights”, Fox News, 
New York: Fox News Network, LLC., accessed 01/01/2010, 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/05/14/cyberbullying-ensnare-free-
speech-rights .  
Künzler, M. (2007) “The state as a key success factor for self-regulation? Empirical 
evidence in brief”, Communications: The European Journal of 
Communication Research, 32(3): 349-355. 
Lenhart, A. (2009) Teens and Sexting. Washington, DC: Pew Internet & American 
Life Project. 
Lessig, L. (1999) Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace. New York: Basic Books. 
Livingstone, S. (2008) “Engaging with media – a matter of literacy?” Communication, 
Culture and Critique, 1(1): 51-62. 
Livingstone, S. (2009) Children and the Internet: Great Expectations, Challenging 
Realities. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Livingstone, S. (2009a) “A rationale for positive online content for 
children”, Communication Research Trends, 28(3): 12-17. 
Livingstone, S., and Haddon, L. (2009) EU Kids Online: Final Report. Deliverable 
D6.5 for the EC Safer Internet plus programme.  London: EU Kids Online, 
accessed 01/01/2010, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24372/ . 
Lobe, B., Livingstone, S., and Haddon, L. (2007) Researching Children’s Experiences 
Online across Countries: Issues and Problems in Methodology, London: EC 
Safer Internet plus programme. 
Lunt, P., and Livingstone, S. (2007) “Regulating markets in the interest of consumers? 
On the changing regime of governance in the financial service and 
communications sectors”, in M. Bevir and F. Trentmann (eds) Governance, 
Citizens, and Consumers: Agency and Resistance in Contemporary Politics.  
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 139-161. 
Madge, N., and Barker, J. (2007) Risk & Childhood. London: The Royal Society for 
the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures & Commerce. 
Mansell, R., and Silverstone, R., eds. (1996) Communication by Design: The Politics 
of Information and Communication Technologies. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 22 
Millwood Hargrave, A., and Livingstone, S. (2009) Harm and Offence in Media 
Content: A Review of the Empirical Literature (Second edition). Bristol: 
Intellect Press. 
Montgomery, K. C. (2007) Generation Digital: Politics, Commerce, and Childhood 
in the Age of the Internet. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Muir, D. (2005) Violence Against Children in Cyberspace: A Contribution to the 
United Nations Study on Violence Against Children. Bangkok: ECPAT 
International. 
Murray, A. (2007) The Regulation of Cyberspace: Control in the Online Environment. 
Abingdon: Routedge-Cavendish. 
National Campaign to Support Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy (2008) Sex and Tech: 
Results from a Survey of Teens and Young Adults. Washington, DC: National 
Campaign to Support Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy, accessed 03/01/2010, 
http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/PDF/SexTech_Summary.pdf . 
NeuStar Inc. (2003) Kids.us Content Policy: Guidelines and Restrictions. Sterling: 
NeuStar Inc. 
Nightingale, V., Dickenson, D., and Griff, C. (2000) Children’s Views about Media 
Harm. Sydney: University of Western Sydney, Australian Broadcasting 
Authority. 
O’Connell, R., and Bryce, J. (2006) Young People, Well-Being and Risk On-Line. 
Strasbourg: Media Division, Directorate General of Human Rights, Council of 
Europe. 
Ofcom (2009) UK Children’s Media Literacy 2009 Annex: Top 50 Websites Visited 
by Children. London: Ofcom, accessed 02/01/2010, 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/advice/media_literacy/medlitpub/medlitpubrss/uk_c
hildrens_ml/ . 
Oswell, D. (2008) “Media and communications regulation and child protection: An 
overview of the field”, in K. Drotner and S. Livingstone (eds) International 
Handbook of Children, Media and Culture. London: Sage Publications, pp. 
475-492. 
Palmer, T., and Stacey, L. (2004) Just One Click: Sexual Abuse of Children and 
Young People Through the Internet and Mobile Telephone Technology. Ilford: 
Barnardo’s. 
Pearson, G. (1983) Hooligan: A History of Respectable Fears. London: Macmillan. 
Petley, J. (2009) “Web control”, Index on Censorship, 38(1): 78-90. 
Preston, C. B. (2009) “All knowledge is not equal: Facilitating children’s access to 
knowledge by making the internet safer”, International Journal of 
Communications Law & Policy, Winter(13): 115-132. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2009) European Framework for Safer Mobile Use by 
Younger Teenagers and Children. London: PricewaterhouseCoopers, accessed 
01/01/2010, 
http://www.gsmeurope.org/documents/PwC_Implementation_Report.pdf . 
Quayle, E., and Taylor, M. (2005) Viewing Child Pornography on the Internet: 
Understanding the Offence, Managing the Offender, Helping the Victims. 
Lyme Regis: Russell House. 
Raboy, M., and Shtern, J. (2010) “Mediated speech and communication rights: 
Situating cyber-bullying within the emerging global Internet governance 
regime”, in S. Shariff and A. Churchill (eds) Truths and Myths of Cyber-
bullying: International Perspectives on Stakeholder Responsibility and 
Children’s Safety. New York: Peter Lang, pp.193-226. 
 23 
Reding, V. (2009) How Can We Empower Youngsters to Stay Safe Online? Innovative 
Solutions in Europe. Stockholm: World Childhood Foundation Seminar, 
accessed 02/01/2010, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/reding/docs/speeches/2009/stockholm
-170909.pdf . 
Reid, A. S. (2009) “Online protection of the child within Europe”, International 
Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 23(3): 217 - 230. 
Rose, N. (1996). “Governing 'advanced' liberal democracies”, in A. Barry, T. Osborne 
and N. Rose (Eds.), Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-
Liberalism and Rationalities of Government (pp. 37-64). London: UCL Press. 
Sarikakis, K., ed. (2007) Media and Cultural Policy in the European Union. 
Amsterdam: Rodopi. 
Schulz, W., and Held, T. (2006) “Together they are strong? Co-regulatory approaches 
for the protection of minors within the European Union”, in U. Carlsson (ed) 
Regulation, Awareness, Empowerment: Young People and Harmful Media 
Content in the Digital Age. Göteborg: Nordicom, pp. 49-65. 
Scott, C. (2001) Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and 
Institutional Design. London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
Shariff, S. and Churchill, A., eds. (2010) Truths and Myths of Cyber-bullying: 
International Perspectives on Stakeholder Responsibility and Children’s 
Safety. New York: Peter Lang. 
Smith, P., Mahdavi, J., Carvalho, M., and Tippett, N. (2006) An Investigation Into 
Cyberbullying, Its Forms, Awareness and Impact, and the Relationship 
Between Age and Gender in Cyberbullying. London: The Anti-Bullying 
Alliance. 
Staksrud, E. (2009) “Problematic conduct: Juvenile delinquency on the Internet”, in S. 
Livingstone and L. Haddon (eds) Kids Online: Opportunities and Risks for 
Children. London: Policy Press, pp. 147-158. 
Szoka, B., and Thierer, A. (2009) “COPPA 2.0: The new battle over privacy, age 
verification, online safety & free speech”, Progress on Point, 16(11), accessed 
03/01/2010, http://pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2009/pop16.11-COPPA-and-age-
verification.pdf . 
Tambini, D., Leonardi, D., and Marsden, C. (2008) Codifying Cyberspace: 
Communications Self-Regulation in the Age of Internet Convergence. London: 
Routledge. 
Thierer, A. (2009) Parental Controls & Online Child Protection: A Survey of Tools 
and Methods. Washington, DC: The Progress & Freedom Foundation. 
United Nations (1989) Convention on the Rights of the Child, accessed 29/1/2008, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm . 
UKCCIS (2009) Click Clever Click Safe. The First UK Child Internet Safety Strategy. 
London: UK Council for Child Internet Safety, accessed 03/01/2010, 
http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/ukccis/download.cfm?catstr=research&downloadurl=
UKCCIS%20Strategy%20Report-WEB1.pdf . 
UNICEF (1999) “The Oslo challenge”, New York: UNICEF, accessed 28/3/07, 
http://www.unicef.org/magic/briefing/oslo.html . 
United States Federal Trade Commission (1998) Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act 1998,15 U.S.C. § 6501–6506, Public Law 105-277, 112 Stat. 
2581-728, enacted October 21, http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/coppa1.htm accessed 
12 Feb 2010. 
 24 
Van Dijk, J. A. G. M. (2006) “Law”, in J. A. G. M. Van Dijk (ed) The Network 
Society: Social Aspects of New Media. London: Sage Publications, pp. 127-
155. 
Vygotsky (1934/1986) Thought and Language. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Waskul, D. D. (2004) Net.seXXX: Readings on Sex, Pornography, and the Internet. 
New York: Peter Lang. 
White House Office of the Press Secretary (2002) “President Bush signs child Internet 
safety legislation”, accessed 11/1/10, 
http://www.cms.kids.us/press/dotkids_news_12.04.02.pdf . 
Willard, N. (2009) There is No Constitutional Right to be a Cyberbully: Analysis of 
J.C. v Beverly Hills Unified School District. Eugene: Center for Safe and 
Responsible Internet Use, accessed 03/01/2010, 
http://webhost.bridgew.edu/marc/JCcyberbullyingcase.pdf . 
Willett, R. (2008) “Consumer citizens online: Structure, agency, and gender in online 
participation”, in D. Buckingham (ed) Youth, Identity, and Digital Media. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 49–69. 
Wolak, J., Finkelhor, D., Mitchell, K. J., and Ybarra, M. L. (2008) “Online 
"predators" and their victims”, American Psychologist, 63(2): 111-128. 
Wyatt, D. (2009) “Digital rights for children and the 20th Anniversary of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child”, accessed 03/01/2010, 
http://www.derekwyatt.co.uk/news_item.aspx?i_PageID=117916 . 
Zürn, M., and Koernig-Archibugi, M. (2006) “Conclusion II: The modes and 
dynamics of global governance”, in M. Koernig-Archibugi and M. Zürn (eds) 
New Modes of Governance in the Global System: Exploring Publicness, 
Delegation and Inclusiveness. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.236-255. 
 
 
 
 
 
 25 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 Parts of this chapter are adapted from material published in Children and the Internet 
(Livingstone 2009); other parts draw on conclusions from the EU Kids Online project (see 
www.eukidsonline.net). In writing this chapter, I was stimulated by a seminar held at the 
Oxford Internet Institute on Child Protection, Free Speech and the Internet: Mapping the 
Territory and Limitations of Common Ground (October 2010). I also draw on my experience 
in directing the pan-European research network, EU Kids Online, funded by the EC (DG 
Information Society) Safer Internet Programme, and advising Ofcom (the Office of 
Communications) during the UK Prime Minister’s Byron Review for Safer Children in a 
Digital World, as well as my roles on the Ministerial Home Access Initiative, the Board of the 
Internet Watch Foundation and as chair of the Expert Research Panel of the newly formed UK 
Council for Child Internet Safety. By reflecting on insights derived from the academy, from 
advising government, and from working with a self-regulatory body, I hope to combine 
contextualised interpretation (in which the researcher draws on insider knowledge) and 
rational interpretation (in which the researcher draws on outsider knowledge), as advocated 
by Bohman (1991). I warmly thank those associated with the above organizations who have, 
in recent years, discussed with me the ideas expressed within this chapter and even checked 
some of the claims I make here – especially Stephen Balkam, John Carr, Anne Collier, 
Richard Collins, Jason De Bono, Leslie Haddon, Zoe Hilton, Peter Robbins, Elisabeth 
Staksrud and Damian Tambini; I also thank the editors of this volume for their comments on 
an earlier version. 
2
 Consider analogous policies in the realm of mass media. These include the US’s Children’s 
Television Act 1990, which mandated three hours of educational television broadcasting for 
children per week on each channel; see also Federal Communications Commission (2008). In 
the UK, the considerable investment of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in 
children’s resources online (http://www.bbc.co.uk/cbbc/) is widely envied in Europe and 
elsewhere although cross-media ownership rules to prevent so-called market distortion limit 
what public service broadcasters may provide for children online. 
3
 For information about the Internet Governance Forum, see 
http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/. 
4
 Specifically, the report called for a Privacy Bill, measures to address illegal file sharing, a 
call for opt-in (rather than opt-out) procedures for behavioral advertizing especially for 
children, for e-safety teaching in the core school curriculum, for point-of-sale e-safety 
messages for mobile phones, for child protection filters to be ‘on’ by default on new mobile 
handsets, for the Internet Watch Foundation’s ‘notice and take-down’ mechanisms for illegal 
child sexual abuse images to be extended worldwide, for legislation to ensure all UK Internet 
service providers operate service-level blocking of such illegal images, for continued support 
for network neutrality, for a minimum guaranteed speed for domestic broadband connections, 
for a voluntary code for internet service providers to detect and deal with malware - to be 
followed by an imposed code if the voluntary system fails, and for a new law to encourage 
internet service providers to detect and remove inappropriate content without losing their 
‘mere conduit’ legal immunity (see All Party Parliamentary Communications Group 2009). 
Similar calls come from the Communications Consumer Panel, affiliated to Ofcom – see, for 
example, its recent recommendation that legislation should require Ofcom to facilitate or, 
failing voluntary compliance, impose a Code of Conduct to protect consumer rights against 
stringent penalties (such as broadband disconnection) against illegal downloading; see 
Communications Consumer Panel (2009).  
5
 This is currently being debated in the US House of Representatives (Kotler 2009). See 
Willard’s (2009) analysis of the recent J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School District case. For 
a recent case to the contrary, see Collier (2009) and for a wider discussion, see Raboy and 
Shtern (2010). 
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6
 According to the EU E-Commerce Regulations 2002, a network operator is not legally liable 
for the consequences of traffic delivered via its networks. 
7
 See also the Pew Internet & American Life Project survey (Lenhart 2009) finding that only 
four percent of 12-to-17-year-olds in the US had sent a sexually suggestive nude or semi-nude 
photo or video of themselves via cellphone;  15 percent had received one on their mobile from 
someone they know personally. 
8
 The term online ‘grooming’ refers to the practice of befriending a child online with the 
intention of sexually abusing them. In 2008-9, the UK’s Child Exploitation and Online 
Protection Centre (CEOP 2009: 38) which addresses the relation between online activities and 
child victims, reported that it had rescued 139 children from sexual abuse, produced 
intelligence reports which led to 334 arrests, and disrupted or dismantled 82 high risk sex 
offender networks. It also reported receiving 50-100 youth reports/month, most of them 
relating to sexual abuse/harassment (CEOP 2009: 18). 
9
 See Title 2, Sect. 214 of the Broadband Data Improvement Act 2008 (Govtrack.us 2008). 
10
 As asserted, ten years on again, by British MP Derek Wyatt, co-chair of the All Party 
Communications Group, in calling on the UN ‘to work in cooperation with legislators and 
civil society to examine and assess whether the Convention on the Rights of the Child fully 
addresses the needs of children around the world in this digital age’ (Wyatt 2009: nd). 
11
 See Council of Europe (2007; 2009).  
12
 See also Viviene Reding’s claim that ‘we need to stimulate the production, visibility and 
take-up of positive content online’ (Reding 2009: nd).  
13
 To those from the US, the UK, Germany or other wealthy countries with large language 
communities, this may seem unnecessary. But to children who speak Czech or Greek or 
Macedonian, very little indeed is available for them on the Internet (Livingstone 2009a). 
Again, political-economic arguments about public service broadcasting, distorting the market 
if extended online, have been prioritized over meeting children’s right to engage with material 
in their own language, without advertizing or undue persuasion, and using the medium of 
their choice, as stated in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
14
 In this regard, internet regulation contrasts with longer communication policy struggles.  
The public service broadcasting provision for example, or the universal service obligation - 
where a relatively coherent policy domain has traditionally been shaped by overarching 
(though still contested) principles (public value, universal service and universal access, the 
regulation of harmful and offensive content, restrictions on commercial messaging) - was 
managed, at least in the UK, by a broadly-trusted regulatory body. In the UK, this has 
generally been the BBC, Ofcom, and before that Oftel and the Independent Television 
Commission), all overseen by a distinct government ministry (again in the UK, Department of 
Media, Culture and Sport, although with substantial input from the Department for Trade and 
Industry, renamed Department for Business and Regulatory Reform, and now Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills) (Collins and Murroni 1996; Freedman 2008). 
15
 In the UK, the Home Secretary’s Task Force for Child Protection on the Internet was set up 
in March 2001 following a report by the Internet Crime Forum (2000). It has produced widely 
implemented guidance – both in the UK and emulated elsewhere - regarding safety messages, 
searching, moderation of chat rooms and instant messaging, reporting of abuse and social 
networking services. This successfully sustained a multi-stakeholder dialogue sufficient to 
produce industry-accepted guidance on moderating interactive services, on the provision of 
chat, instant messaging and other web-based services used by children, and on safe search 
procedures and parental tools, much of it later implemented on a European and international 
level (e.g., Safer Social Networking Principles for the EU, European Commission 2009a). 
These and diverse other initiatives (e.g., a Kitemark for end user filtering software, guidance 
for social networking sites, internet safety materials for teachers and public awareness raising 
campaigns for parents) are now being coordinated by the UK Council for Child Internet 
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Safety, established by Prime Minister Gordon Brown in 2008 to implement the 
recommendations of The Byron Review (Byron 2008). 
16
 See http://www.chis.org.uk/uploads/01.pdf . 
17
 This is not to say existing legislation does not apply here - the US’s Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Act 1998 (United States Federal Trade Commission (1998), which 
precludes the collection of personal information from children younger than 13 years of age 
without parental permission, has resulted in Facebook setting 13 as the lower age limit for 
registration. 
18
 A 2009 statement saw ICANN commit ‘to maintain and improve robust mechanisms for 
public input, accountability, and transparency so as to ensure that the outcomes of its 
decision-making will reflect the public interest and be accountable to all stakeholders’ 
(ICANN 2009: nd). 
19
 Lest one doubt the severity of this material, the organization (IWF 2008) reports that some 
80 percent of internet sites hosting child sexual abuse images are commercial operations, and 
that 10 percent of the child victims being sexually abused – this including scenes of rape, in 
photographs or videos on these sites – appear to be under two years old; 33 percent appear 
between three and six years of age; and 80 percent appear to be under the age of ten (IWF 
2008). IWF data show a trend towards increasing severity of the abuse portrayed, supporting 
the IWF’s claim that ‘behind every statistic is a child who has been sexually abused and 
exploited and, whilst images of the abuse are in circulation on the internet, that abuse is 
perpetuated’ (IWF 2008: 8). 
20
 See Memorandum of Understanding Between Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) concerning Section 46 Sexual Offences Act 
2003 (IWF 2007).  
21
 Indeed, there were suggestions in some quarters that failure to utilize the IWF list could 
potentially render a non-compliant ISP liable for hosting illegal content or even precipitate 
legislation to make such blocking compulsory (Brown in press). 
22
 One challenging consequence of widespread Internet use is the extent to which youthful 
activities may be newly rendered illegal – from downloading music from peer-to-peer 
networks to circulating hate messages or producing indecent images of one’s boy/girlfriend 
on a mobile phone. 
23
 In 2002, this children’s ‘walled garden’ appeared successful. When President Bush signed 
the Dot-Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act in the USA, he said: ‘This bill is a wise and 
necessary step to safeguard our children while they use computers and discover the great 
possibilities of the Internet. Every site designated .kids will be a safe zone for children’ 
(White House Office of the Press Secretary 2002: np). However, since dot.kids sites could not 
connect to any sites outside the domain (NeuStar Inc. 2003), few organizations invested in 
populating the domain and it is effectively inactive. 
24
 For example, in the UK, the top ten sites visited by 6-11 year olds include Google, eBay, 
MSN, YouTube and Facebook (Ofcom 2009). 
25
 As revealed by a survey conducted by the ITU’s Child Online Protection initiative of the 
191 Member States of the ITU in late 2009 (ITU 2009). 
26
 For a balanced overview, see ‘Online Safety 3.0: Empowering & Protecting Youth’ 
(ConnectSafely 2009).  
27
 Pearson (1983) develops a critique of the moral panic thesis in relation to the sociological 
emergence of hooligans, while Staksrud (2009) identifies the evidence that children and 
young people act as hooligans online – charting their activities in relation to cyberbullying, 
hacking, illegal downloading, plagiarism and so forth. 
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28
 Norway’s laws, as well as that of the UK, against online grooming are examples of this: in 
the UK, this is Section 46 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003; in Norway, it is Norwegian 
Criminal Code § 201. Other examples include the Australian Cyber Stalking Law (1999) and 
the US’s Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (1998); see also Montgomery (2007). 
29
 See for example, the Internet Governance Forum’s Dynamic Coalition on Child Online 
Safety, which aims ‘[t]o create a permanent, open platform for discussion on fundamental and 
practical issues related to child online safety within the agenda of the Internet Governance 
Forum, ensuring dialogue among representatives from children's organizations, government, 
industry, academia and other civil society groups’ (IGF nd: np). See also the ITU’s Child 
Online Protection initiative (ITU 2009), the Council of Europe’s Recommendation 1882 
(Council of Europe 2009), and also the current work of the OECD ‘Working Party on 
Information Security and Privacy’ on the protection of children online. 
30
 See ‘Answers to APEC Children Protection Project Questionnaire’, APEC-OECD Joint 
Symposium on Initiatives Among Member Economies Promoting Safer 
Internet Environment for Children, Singapore 15 April 2009, accessed 11/1/10,  
http://aimp.apec.org/Documents/2009/TEL/TEL39-SPSG-SYM/09_tel39_spsg_sym_018.pdf. 
 
